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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
C~-\.'rH_._-\.RIN".b~ S. GIBBONS,
Plaint-iff and ~.fppellant
-YS-

BYRON

BRI~I~I~

and 'v-ife

HILD~\ ~\, BRIJ\L~I,

Case No. 7596
...~PPELLANT 'S

BRIEF

Defendants and Respondents

ST_A_TEMENT OF FACTS
The plaintiff, a \vidow, prior to the year 1936, had
been regularly employed at Lynn Brother's hospital,
at Pocatello, Idaho, as a registered nurse. Due to her
mother's illness, plaintiff can1e hon1e to nurse and care
for her until her death in 1938. Her brother M. L. Anderson, a bachelor, was also living at the home taking
care of the farm, and after their mother's death they
continued to live together until his sudden death in
October, 1947. (Tr. 151) Plaintiff's health was poorly
at the time of his death and she required some one to
live with her during periods of sickness. Plaintiff's
brother, George L. Anderson and his wife, came from
California to attend the funeral of M. L. Anderson, and
re1nained with the plaintiff fro1n October, 1947, until
about June 1, 1948, when they left and returned to California. George had planted crops of sugar beets and
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grain on the farm land hereinafter mentioned prior to
his departure. (Tr. 116) Plaintiff was then 75 years of
age, sickly and infirm and was in need of SOllleone to live
V\7

itl1, care for, and nurse her.

Plaintiff was then the owner of an eight-ninths undivided interest in the real property described in the
co1nplaint, consisting of 20 acres of irrigated farm land,
87 acres of grazing land and about 2 lots of town property, with a home, barn, garage, and granary situated
thereon, and two cows, farm implements and household
furniture. Plaintiff's interest in said property was of
the admitted value of $10,600.00, and it was unencumbered. (Tr. 387, 388) Plaintiff's brother, John C. Anderson, was the owner of the other one-ninth interest
In .the real property.
The defendants are husband and wife, having intermarried on December 23, 1947. Tr. 115, 222) Defendant Hilda A. Brimm is plaintiff's niece, and on June
· 1, 1948, they resided in Ogden, Utah. The defendant
Byron Brimm was then unemployed, (Tr. 456) and defendant Hilda Brimm had just completed teaching school
in Ogden, for the current school term. (Tr. 77, 80) At
plaintiff's request the defendants carne to 1\{endon, a-. bout June 8, 1948, and began to live with and care for
plaintiff, and also cultivated and cared for the crops.
(Tr. 79, 80) .
The plaintiff and defendants lived together during
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the sununer of 1948, and about September 1st, liilda
1noved back to Ogden, to teach school, taking the plaintiff \Yith her.

('11 r. 80)

Byron harvested the crops,

and usually he \\·ent to Ogden on weekends, to visit
Hilda and the plaintiff. (Tr. 81) Between Thanksgiving tiine and ('ihrist1nas, 1948, plaintiff had trouble
\Yith her heart. She \\·as confined in the Dee Hospital
fron1 Decen1ber 17th to the 29th, 1948. (Tr. 81, 236)
During this period of time defendant Brim1n was visiting relatives in :Jiinnesota. He returned during the
first part of January, 1949. (Tr. 82)
On January 23, 1949, the defendants induced the
plaintiff to convey to defendant Hilda Brimm the eightninths undivided interest in the real property above
1nentioned, in consideration of their agreement to live
\Yith plaintiff, care for, and nurse her in sickness, and
treat her \vith due respect and affection, maintain and
support her for and during the remainder of her natural
life and pay for her medical, doctor and burial expenses.
(Tr. 83, 84) The deed and bill of sale were prepared by
Attorney D. R. Dickens, of Ogden, at the defendant's
request. (Tr. 184) The plaintiff relied upon the defendant's promise and agreement at the time she executed
the deed, (PI's Ex "Q", Tr. 84), and that no other
consideration passed between plaintiff and defendants
for the conveyance of said property. (Tr. 83) That at
the same time and without plaintiff's knowledge, and
without consideration, save the foregoing agreement, deSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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fendants procured plaintiff's signature to a bill of sale
(Pl's Ex. "U") transfering to defendant Hilda Brimm
the household furniture, farm implements and two cows.
(Tr. 201)
The parties resided at Ogden, until the end of school,
about June 1, 1949, when they moved to Mendon for the
summer.

Defendant Bryon Brimm had returned to

l\lendon earlier to plant the crops.
About June 22, 1949, plaintiff's brother John Anderson, for a cash consideration of $2,000.00, conveyed
the remaining one-ninth undivided interest in said property to Hilda Brimm. (Tr. 86) This money was provided
by the plaintiff. (Tr. 87) There was no consideration
passed from Hilda to the plaintiff, except the services
to be rendered under the previous agree1nent of January
25, 1949, by the defendants to plaintiff. (Tr. 112)
During the month of July, 1949, and after the defendant Hilda Brimm had acquired title to all of plaintiff's property, real and personal, of the admitted value
of $16,600.00, defendant Byron Brimm began to manifest
to,vards plaintiff an arrogant and overbearing attitude.
He refused to eat with or otherwise associate with her,
and failed to sho"r any solicitation or concern for plaintiff's welfare. (Tr. 98) And during the fall of 1949, he
refused to call at the apartment in Ogden or associate
with her in any manner. (Tr. 90) The defendants spent
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5
the \Yeekends in :Jiendon, during this tilne, often leaving
plaintiff alone at Ogden, ( Tr. 91)
The defendants left for l\1innesota a few days prior
to Dece1nber 25, 19-!9, leaving plaintiff with her sister,
l\lrs. Bruce Pett. (Tr. 92) Hilda 'returned about Jan nary
1, 1950, to resun1e her school work. (Tr. 92) Hilda didn't
sho\v 1nuch interest in plaintiff after her return froin
1\'Iinnesota in January, 1950. The fact that Byron refused to liye 'vith plaintiff was manifesting itself
through Hilda's indifference towards plaintiff. (Tr. 92)
She told plaintiff that it was causing a separation bet,veen then1 because Byron refused to live in the apartnlent as long as plaintiff remained there. (Tr. 93) During the winter of 1949-50, Hilda left plaintiff alone in
the apart1nent during the day time. (Tr. 94, 147, 149)
Hilda also physically abused plaintiff (Tr. 93, 95, 168,
177' 211, 212, 214)
Byron Brinnn returned from Minnesota about February 10, 1950, and registered at the Earl Hotel at
Ogden. (Tr. 363) About 5 o'clock p.m. he called Hilda
on the phone, and she left the apartment to meet hin1,
and returned to the apartment alone later in the evening·.
(Tr. 96) On Sunday, February 12, 1950, plaintiff decided
to leave the apartment and return to her ho1ne in Men·don, and was taken there by Mr. and Mrs. Robbins.
(Tr. 96, 97) Later the same day Hilda and Attorney
Dickens went to Mendon and brought plaintiff back to
Ogden, (Tr. 97) and upon their arrival there, plaintiff
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told Hilda that she didn't want to live with her any.
longer, under the circumstances as they there existed.
(Tr. 98)
A few days before February 13, 1950, plaintiff
asked Hilda to deed the property back to her, and Hilda
said that "Byron wouldn't let me do that." (Tr. 166)
Plaintiff testified, that during the fall and winter of
1949, and 1950, defendant Hilda Brimm left her alone,
and when she came home from school Hilda was cross
and irritable towards plaintiff. (Tr. 167) During the
sa1ne period of time plaintiff testified that Hilda had
shaken her a few times; that Hilda would shake· her
and sit her down in a chair or a sofa. Plaintiff became very nervous and it made her feel as though she
'vasn't wanted there. (Tr. 168) Hilda refused to permit
any friends to visit with plaintiff. (Tr. 168) Plaintiff
had, occasionally, during the winter of 1949, 1950, exehanged visits with Mrs. Lucy Robbins, who lived.nearby, but when defendant Hilda learned of this_ she 'vent
to ~:irs. Rob bins' home and told her not to call to see
plaintiff again. (Tr. 169) This occured shortly before
February 13, 1950, when plaintiff rescinded the contract and moved out.
On Monday evening February _13, Hilda took the
plaintiff to the home of Mrs. Leva Thornton in Ogden.
( Tr. 98) Plaintiff left the apartment because she felt
it would be absolutely impossible to live with Hilda, because of her neglect and mistreatment, and in view of
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Byron ,s absolute refusal to live w·ith the1n as long as
plaintiff re1na.ined there ( Tr. 99) For son1etirne preYious to Feb!"uary 13, plaintiff had decided to rescind
the contract of J-anuary 25, 1949. ( Tr. 100) Before
plaintiff left for Ogden in September 1949, she felt that
defendants \\~ere not treating her right. ( Tr. 100) And
~ubsequently, during the fall and winte! of 1949-1950,
plaintiff 'Yas convinced that defendants were not interested in plaintiff nor her welfare. That they let her
~hift for herself. (Tr. 147, 149) It had affected plaintiff"s health. l\frs. Thornton testified that plaintiff 'vas
nerYous and upset when she can1e to her home on February 13, and that plaintiff had bruises on her arm.
(Tr. 186, 191) Plaintiff lived with Mrs. T-hornton until
about ~Jay 18, 1950, during which time her mental and
physical condition improved. (Tr. 100, 188)
When plaintiff moved to the Thornton home, Byron
Brimm immediately rnoved into the apartment with
Hilda. (Tr. 363) 'Vhile plaintiff 'vas living at the Thornton home, defendant Hilda Brimm called occasionally,
and after she left, plaintiff would cry and say to Mrs.
Thornton, "She's so hard towards me. She's not like
Hilda used to be," and she'd fret about it. (Tr. 188)
About May 1, 1950, Hilda told plaintiff that Byron was
living in the home at 1\rfendon, and Mrs. Thornton testified that it had an adverse effect upon plaintiff. Plaintiff told 11:rs. Thornton that she just couldn't understand wh~\T, "she had to be put out of her home 'vhen ~I r.
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Brimm was living in it. She thought that she had as
n1uch right to live there as she ever had and that she
was going home." Mr. Thornton took her to Mendon on
l\iay 18, 1950. (Tr. 189, 190) Defendant Hilda Brimm
told Mrs. Thornton that she and plaintiff couldn't
get along. (Tr. 186, 199) Plaintiff also told Mrs. Thornton that she couldn't get along with Hilda, that Hilda
'vasn't good to her. (Tr. 198)
Plaintiff left the Thornton hon1e on ~fay 18, 1950,
and arrived at the home in Mendon about 10:30 a.n1.
and proceeded to clean up the house. The next morning
the defendants arrived from Ogden, and during the day
an altercation ensued between defendant Hilda Brimn1
and plaintiff. (Tr. 204-207) Plaintiff testified that Hilda
struck her and otherwise abused her. (Tr. 215); and
that defendant Brimm urged Hilda to "knock her down,
slap her face." (Tr. 205) That evening plaintiff was
found walking along one of the streets in Mendon, by
Jay Jensen, and he picked her up and took her to the
home of William Kidman, his father-in-law, in Petersboro, where plaintiff thereafter resided and was residing
at the time of trial. (Tr. 207)
When the defendants ·began to live ·with plaintiff
about June 8, 1948, she had a checking account with the
First National Bank of Logan. That on the the 16th day
of August, 1948, the plaintiff authorized said bank to
place Hilda Brimm's name upon the account, thus permitting Hilda to draw checks against said account for
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plaintiff's use and benefit. That beginning about June
1, 194S, and continuing to September 10, 1949, when

said account '\Yas closed by the defendant Hilda Brimm,
the checks dra'\Yn against said aceount aggregated
$3137.74. Plaintiff testified that at least $2350.00 of said
an1ount '\Yas used for household expenses, for the mutual
benefit of plaintiff and defendants. That during the
school tern1 of 1948 ,1949, Hilda Brimm taught school
at Ogden, and received a salary of $3000.00, and for the
next tern1 1949-1950 she received $3150.00, or a total of
$6150.00. (Tr. 357) That during the aforesaid period of
tune defendants had no automobile of their own, so they
used plaintiff's Pontiac sedan for family purposes, and
for their benefit. ( Tr. 357-358)
Prior to February 21, 1949, plaintiff was the owner
of 160 acres of dry-farm land in Po,ver County, Idaho,
and on February 21, 1949, when plaintiff was confined
in the Dee Hospital at Ogden, this property was sold to
\,..adell Swenson, of Malad, Idaho, for $8000.00, of which
amount $4000.00 was paid in cash, and a note for the
balance of $4000.00, secured by a first mortgage on the
property. On February 23, 1949, while plaintiff was still
confined in the hospital, Attorney D. R. Dickens prepared what purports to be a 'vritten assignment of the
aforesaid note and mortgage, and he and defendant
Byron Brimm procured plaintiff's signature to said
assignment, (Tr. 327) and it was thereafter filed for
record with the county recorder of Power County, State
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of Idaho, on March 4, 1949. (Defendant's Exhibit 3)
Along in April, 1949, plaintiff was informed of the
Hale of the Idaho property to the Swensons, and the
terms thereof. Plaintiff inquired of Hilda if she could
exa1nine the note of $4000.00, and the mortgage on the
Idaho property given to secure the payment thereof.
Fro1n that time plaintiff retained possession of these
instruments, and when she left defendant's apartment
on February 13, 1949, plaintiff had only 30 cents, and
being in need of funds she made a loan with the First
National Bank of Logan, and gave the bank an assignment of the Swenson note and mortgage to secure payInent thereof.
On or about May 25, 1950, plaintiff commenced an
action to cancel and set aside the purported written
assignment (Defendant's exhibit 3), in the District
Court of Power County, Idaho, where the land conveyed
to the Swensons is situated. The summons was duly
·and regularly issued by the Idaho Court and was served
upon the defendants in Cache County, Utah, on June 12,
1950, on which date trial was commenced in the case
at bar. When the trial was res_umed on June 21, 1950,
(Tr. 157), the defendants moved ~the court for permission to file an amended answer to interplead the transaction involved in the Idaho action, in the instant case.
And notwithstanding the District Court of Power County, Idaho, had acquired jurisdiction of the defendants
by personal service of summons upon them, which they
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did not question; (Tr. 159) and although the property

described in the n1ortgage referred to in the written
assign1nent, (Defendant's Exhibit 3) was located in
Power County, Idaho, (Tr. 158) and alt~ough it "\Vas an
entirely separate transaction from any transaction
pleaded in plaintiff's a1nended compaint and amendInents thereto, yet the trial court permitted the defendants to file said a1nended answer ( tr. 161) and later
achnitted evidence relating to said transaction over
plaintiff's objection. (Tr. 254)
The foregoing statement covers most of the pertinent facts in the case, however, if any facts have been
overlooked, they 'vill likely be covered in the discussion
of the evidence in the several points raised.
The plaintiff brought this action asking:
That the Court cancel, set aside, and declare
null and void the deed and bill of sale. (Causes of actions
1 and 4)
1.

2.

Judgment for $2000.00, (Cause of action 2)

3. For an accounting on checking and savings accounts, and for proceeds of 1949 crops. (Causes of actions 3 and 3)
4. Costs of Court and general relief.
The Court by its Decree:
1. Held against plaintiff and in favor of defendants on all causes of action contained in plaintiff's aSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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mended complaint and amendments thereto.
2. Reformed the contract of January 25, 1949, between plaintiff and defendants, relieving the latter of
the duty of living with or rendering any services whatsoever for plaintiff and requiring only that defendants
pay for plaintiff's keep which was fixed at $75.00 per
month and permitting plaintiff the exclusive use of the
home at Mendon, where she may live, and in event of
sickness, she may hire a person to care for her at defendants' cost.
3. That the legal title to the real estate is vested in
Hilda Brimm, together with the exclusive use thereof
and income therefrom, provided however, that a lien is
in1pressed thereon and sale thereof is enjoined during
the natural life of plaintiff.
Statement of Points Upon Which Appellant Intends to
Rely for Reversal of Judgment and Decree.

1. The Court erred in making the following finding in Finding of Fact No. 1-that plaintiff "was at all
times capable and competent in all respects to transact
business,'' and the Court erred in making its finding No.
10, and its Conclusions and Decree.
2. The Court erred in making its Finding of Fact
numbers 1, 2, 3, 4, 8, 10, 12, and 14, and its Conclusion
of Law and Decree and all parts threof, and the Court
erred by its failure and refusal to make and enter its
findings of fact, conclusions of law and Decree, holding
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that defendants had com1nitted a breach of the contract and rescinding the san1e; also its failure and refusal to cancel the deed and bill of sale.
3. The Court erred in 1naking its Finding of Fact
ntunber 11, and its Conclusions of Law and its Decree,
by "yhich the court has 1nodified and reformed the contract of January 23, 1949, entered into between the
parties.

-±, The Court erred in making its Finding of Fact
nrnnbers 6, 7, 11, 13 and making and entering its Conclusions of Law and Decree; in permitting the amended
ans\Yer to be filed to include consideration of Idaho
transaction; ( Tr. 161) in receiving evidence over plaintiff's objection in relation thereto; (Tr. 254) .denying
plaintiff's motion of August 3, 1950; (Tr. 42) and denying plaintiff's motion of August 24, 1950. (Tr. 43, 44)

ARGUMENT
Point 1
This case presents for consideration two principal
questions: First-Did defendants agree to care for
plaintiff as alleged in paragraph 5 of her amended complaint, and did she sign the deed (Pl. Ex. '' Q' ') and the
bill of sale (Pl. Ex. "U") in reliance upon said agreement; and, Secondly, was there a breach of said agreement by the defendants, as alleged in paragraphs 6, 7,
8 of plaintiff's amended complaint. (Tr. 3, 4)
Finding of Fact No. 10, states in part that on the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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25th day of January, 1949, without solicitation or request of the defendants, but because of past and then relationship, affection and confidence, and to save probate
expenses, the plaintiff voluntarily and deliberately conveyed, the real and personal property in question, to
defendant Hilda Brimm. No doubt that the intent and
purpose of this finding is to show that the defendants
n1ade no promise or agreement with plaintiff to care
for her as consideration for the deed and bill of sale-.
This finding is contrary to the evidence and also to
admissions contained in defendants' answer as will be
hereinafter referred to. Reference will first be made
to the pleadings and then to the evidence.
In paragraph 5 of plaintiff's complaint it is alleged
that, defendants proposed to plaintiff, that if she would
convey and transfer the real estate described in said
co1nplaint to the defendant Hilda Brimm, that defendant$ would live with plaintiff, care for and nurse her
in her sick and enfeebled condition, and treat her with
due respect and affection for and during her natural
life, and pay for her doctor, n1edical, and funeral expenses. This paragraph is re-pleaded in plaintiff's
fourth cause of action with respect to the cancellation of
the bill of sale, by which plaintiff pDJ<iportedly transfered
to defendant Hilda Brimm, the personal property described therein. (Tr. 25, 26)
While defendants deny in their further answer (Tr.
14) that they made any agreement with plaintiff such
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a~ i~ alleg·ed in paragraph 5 of the plain.tiff's a1nended

eo1nplaint, they do allege in paragraph 5 of their further
an8\\~er

( Tr. 13), '·that upon the delivery of said deed

as hereinbefore stated, the defendant, Byron Brin1m,
pro1nised and agreed 'vith this defendant to assist her
in carrying out her arrangements as herein stated to
plaintiff," and in paragraph 6 of their further answer
(Tr. 15) defendants allege, "That ..... this defendant,
with the assistance of the defendant, Byron Brim1n,
furnished and supplied the plaintiff with all possible attention, comfort, kindness, con1panionship possible, and
help in every way.'' These allegations when read together, first admit that there was an ''arrangement''
to care for the plaintiff, and secondly a claim of
performance of the ''arrangement'' or agreement by
the defendants. The foregoing allegations by the defendants of the "arrangement" with plaintiff made
prior to the time she signed the deed and bill of sale,
concedes that there was an agreement made by the defendants with plaintiff that if she would convey and
transfer to Hilda Brimm the real and personal property
described in deed and bill of sale plaintiff's Exs. "Q"
and "lJ" ,that they would care for her the remainder
of her natural life, and pay for her medical, doctor and
funeral expenses.
Plaintiff's recollection of the agreement made to
her by the defendants on January 25, 1949, and prior
to the time she signed the deed and bill of sale appears
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in the record as follows:
"That they would care for me, and love me
and take care of me and bury me.'' ''Well, they
promised to care for me if I would deed them the
1>roperty.'' ''They would care for me, make a
home for me, and love me, and after it was
through they would put me away, bury me." (Tr.
83, 84)
l n an atten1pt to take off the edge of their agree-

lTIPnt to care for the plaintiff as the only consideration
for the convevanee and transfer of the title to the aforesaid real and personal property, the defendants allege
in their ans,ver, and the trial court erronously found in
r~inding of Fact No. 10, that, plaintiff voluntarily and
deliberately proposed to and did convey or cause to be
C'OnYeyed the whole of the real and personal property
hereinbefore described or referred to, to the defendant
Hilda .A.. Brimm.'' (Tr. 52)
''rith respect to whether plaintiff signed the deed
voluntarilY her testimony appearing in the record shows

(Tr. 150, 131

'' Q. Whether you did it voluntarily or willingly. I '11 ask you whether or not you signed the
deed when they first presented it to you. A. No,
Sir. Q. How long did you wait before you actually signed it. A. Oh, it was two or three days.
!Q. And in the meantime, I'll ask whether or not
you asked them to get in touch with me. A. yes,
I did. Q. What was their response to that? A.
Their response was that you were in the east.
;Q. .And that I wasn't in Logan f .A. That you
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".,.eren 't in Logan, and they wanted it fixed up
and you weren't here.'
The foregoing testimony shows conclusively that
plaintiff was urged by defendants to sign the deed, and
that she hesitated to sign it. She also testified that she
received no n1oney consideration. ( Tr. 83)
And it is also interesting to observe that the defendant's testimony to the effect that nothing was said
by them to plaintiff about taking care of her at the time
she signed the deed and bill of sale, is contradicted
by their witness, nir. Dickens. (Tr. 322, 323) On cross
exa1nination he admitted that something was said with.
respect to that matter by defendants to plaintiff, and as
shown by the record he testified:

Q. Didn't Hilda tell her there she would take
care of her the rest of her life and support her
and maintain her~ A. She said she'd care for her
and see that she had a home, and look after her
for doctor bills, hospital expenses and everything
and provide a home for the rest of her life. Q.
She said she'd pay for her burial expenses and
in order words she would do everything for her
that was required by way of support and mainA. That's
tenance and nursing, didn't she~
right". (Tr. 322, 323) Q. That's why she signed
the deed~ A. Yes, she said she didn't want the
worry of it. She wanted a place where she'd be
taken care of by somebody that could look after
her and she wouldn't have to worry if anything
came along unexpected. Q. Did Mrs. Brimm say
she'd relieve her of that worry and she wouldn't
have anything to worry about~ A. She told her
she would take care of her. Q. She assured her
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of

that~

A. That's right (Tr. 323)

It will thus be seen from plaintiff's testhnony,
which is corroborated by defendant's witness, Mr. Dick·ens, that before plaintiff signed the deed in question,
the defendants promised and agreed that they would
live with, care for her and nurse and support her and
treat her with kindness, love and respect, as a member
of their family. And plaintiff testified that she had
implicit confidence in defendant Hilda, and relied upon
her especially to carry out the aforesaid contract made
by the defendants to plaintiff before she signd the deed
and bill of sale.
That portion of the foregoing finding that plaintiff
conveyed the property to Hilda Brimn1 ''to save costs
o£ probate" is ridiculous. When plaintiff was asked if
this was a fact, she testified that she wouldn't be alive
to pay it, so that, it was a matter of indifference to
her. (Tr. 183) Evidently the defendants did not only
'vant to avoid paying cost of probate·, but they wanted a
deed of conveyance which to them was much 1nore secure
than a will.
It is stated in Finding of Fact numbers 1 and 10
that on January 25, 1949, plaintiff was mentally alert
and in all respects competent and capable to transact
business. The evidence shows that plaintiff had sick
spells during the summer of 1948 (Tr. 79), and heart
trouble in November 1948, and was confined in the hospital at Ogden, from December 19, to 29, 1948. (Tr. 81,
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238) Plaintiff w·as again seriously stricken on Februar~,.
20, 1949, and 'vas confined in the hospital for about three
\Yeeks. She was sickly during the summer of 1949, (Tr.
87) and in Septe1nber, she \Vas confined in the hospital
at Logan for about three weeks, (Tr. 87) It 1nay be
COnceded that she \YaS in normal frame of mind for
her condition, but it is doubtful that under the circtunstances her mind "-as very alert.

a

The relationship ·between the· parties as it existed
on January 25, 1949, prior to and and at the time plaintiff signed the deed and bill of sale, strongly rese1nbles
the relationship between the parties in the recent lTtah
case of \V.ard v. 'Vard 85 P. 2d. 635. The relationship
there 'vas bet\veen :31rs. Ward and her son J. H. Ward,
and the facts are very similar to the instant case. In
that case Mrs. Ward made a will in which she devised
her property to J. H. Ward, in consideration of his
agreement that he and his family would occupy a portion
of the ho1ne and care for :Nirs. Ward, and operate the
far1n on a rental basis; and that upon her death, he
was to pay $1000.00 to each of his four sisters. The
terms of the oral agreement pertaining to his duties
in the operation of the farm and ·the services that he
and his family were expected to render for Mrs. Ward
are stated in the opinion at page 639, as follows:
"Defendant further agreed that he would at
all times be a dutiful and loving son; that he and
his family would move into a portion of the
plaintiff's home and that they would make life
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agreeable to plaintiff during her declining years
and that they would . bestow upon plaintiff that
degree of affection that she had a right to assume
would be bestowed upon her by her only son and
his family."
The foregoing agreement made by J. H. Ward to his
InothPr was relied upon by Mrs. Ward before she exe('Ute<l the will, as was found by the trial court in that
ea~e:

''That relying upon said promises, plaintiff
executed said will and later permitted defendant
and his family to move into said home and thereafter entered into an oral lease as aforesaid.''
In the Ward case, supra, this court held in effect,
ti1at the contract made by J. H. Ward with his mother
should be strickly enforced, so that his aged and infirn1
1nother would not be imposed upon.
And under the facts and circumstances attending
the execution and delivery of the deed and bill of sale
in question, it is immaterial as a matter of law whether
the plaintiff conveyed the property voluntarily or under
pressure. When an aged person conveys property to
a relative without money consideration, under the
facts as shown by the evidence in this case, the law in1poses a strick duty upon the grantee to perform the
contract so that the grantor will be protected.
The rule is well stated by the Supreme Court of
Oregon in Storey-Bracher Lumber Co. vs. Burnett el. al.
123 Pac. 66, where the court said:
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'" \\rhere a conveyance is made in consideration of the 1naintenance of aged people, according to the ter1ns of a contract like the one in
question, it is the duty of the courts to zealously
de1nand n strict perfor1nance of the conditions of
the conveyance on the part of grantees. Thomas
v. Thon1as, 2± Or. 251, 33 Pac. 565; Bryant v.
Erskine, 55 ~le. 153.
And the Supre1ne Court of Minnesota in Bruer v.
Bruer, 123, K.\\'. 813, 28, L. R. A. (N. S.) 608, in characterizing an agree1nent \vhich for1ns the consideration
for a deed to the aged person's property stated:
''Contracts and agreements of this kind are
quite familiar to the courts. They are, as a rule,
made by people well along in years, with a child
or other relative, and are intended to secure to
the old people proper and suitable support and
maintenance during their declining years, at the
same time relieving them of the care and responsibility incident to the management of their
affairs. They part with their property in the expectation and belief that their future necessities
and comforts are fully provided for, and in an
abiding faith that natural affection and filial
duty will prompt and secure a faithful discharge
of the obligations assumed by the child to whom
they convey. There is in such transactions an
element of confidence reposed by the old people
in their grantee, sacred in its nature, a breach of
which, and retention of the benefits, no· court
should tolerate by a refinement upon technical
rules and principles of law. By the modern trend
of authority these transactions are placed in a
class by themselves, and enforced without reference to the form or phraseology of the writing
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by which they are expressed, or whether by the
strict letter of the law a forfeiture of the estate
is expressly provided for." (Italics supplied)
In O·ustin v. Crockett, (Wash.) 97 Pac. 1091, the
Supreine Court reversed the trial court and in the course
of the opinion said:
''This is but the common instance of
people who are old and infirm conveying their
property to their children or to others in whon1
they have trust and confidence where the consideration for the conveyance is in whole or in part
an agreement for future support and maintenance. In such cases courts of equity have never
failed to rescind the contract and cancel the deed
for a willful violation of the agreement to support and maintain, and they never inquire whether the transaction was fraudulent in its inception or not.''
And likewise is the case of Lewelling v. McElroy,
(Neb.) 27 N. ""\iV. 2d. 268, 'vhere the court held:
"We have repeatedly held that where a
grantor conveys land in consideration of an
agreement of the grantee to support, maintain,
and care for the grantor during his lifetime,
and the grantee neglects or refuses to comply
with the contract, the deed may be set aside and
the title quieted in the grantor. See Mcintire v.
Mcintire, 75 Neb. 397 ,106 N. W. 29; Tomsik v.
Tomsik, 78 Neb. 103 110 N. W. 674; McCoy v.
Cunningham, 141 Heb. 708, 4 N. W. 2d 835. See,
also Wilcox v. Wilcox, 138 Neb. 510, 293, N. W.
378; Copass y. Wilborn, 139 Neb. 124, 296, N. W.
565." (Italics supplied)
In the case of Cree v. Sherify, (Ind.) 37 N. E. 787,
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to his son for fntnre support and 1naintenance, and
upon the violation of said agree1nent, the father sued
for cancellation of the deed. In pointing· out the duty
of a grantee under such facts the court adopted the
follo"-ing rule:
. . ''Conveyances of property by aged and infirlil people to their children, in consideration of
promised support and maintenance, are some'vhat peculiar in their character and incidents,
and niust so;neti1nes be dealt with by the courts
on principles not applicable to ordinary conveyances. A person incapitated by the infirmities
of age for active pursuits naturally feels a strong
desire to place the fruits of his industry and
enterprise where they will secure him, during the
re1nnant of his life, a suitable and proper maintenance, without further care or labor on his
part." (Italics supplied)
It 'vill be seen from the foregoing cases that deeds
of conveyance from aged and infirm people to their
children or relatives, in consideration of promised support, care and 1naintenance, are scrutinized very carefully, so that the aged will not be imposed upon. Contracts of this character are usually oral so that the
grantee, as 'vas true in this case, 1nay contend that the
grantor voluntarily and without any urge frorn the
grantee, conveyed the property. Thus, in order to provide safeguards in such event, the courts hold that there
is an ilnplied contract requiring the grantee to perfor1n
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fault thereof the conveyance is canceled and set aside.
Point 2
!Jid the defendants commit a breach of said contract?
F,indings of Fact numbers 10 and 12, Conclusions
and the De.cree state and provide that subsequent to
,) an nary 2:-), 1949, the defendants cared for the plaintiff
a n<l extended to her all possible attention, comfort, kindne~s and cornpanionship and help in every way. That is.
the eourt found, concluded and decreed that defendants
had performed the contract made by them prior to the
ti1ne the deed and bill of sale were signed by plaintiff.
It is respectfully submitted that the court erred in making the aforesaid findings, conclusions and decree, because they are not supported by the evidence but are
contrary to the great weight of the evidence, as will

be hereinafter shown.
Plaintiff alleged in paragraph six, seven, and eight
of her amended complaint, that, beginning in the month
of July, 1949, the defendant Byron Brimm continuously
thereafter refused to associate with or live with the
plaintiff. With respect to how the defendant Brimin
treated plaintiff in the summer of 1949, her testimony
appears in the record as follows: Q. Do you know whether any trouble arose there between you and Mr. Brimn1
during the summer, last summer~ A. Yes. Q. When
was it~ What happened there~ A. Well, he refused to
eat at the same table with me and he wouldn't talk
to me and-and if I asked him anything it wasn't any of
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n1y affairs. Q. Did you attempt to talk to hi1n on various
occasions~

.A.. 1-\ nu1nber of times. Q. And can you
state to the Court in a general 'vay what he said to you
on those occasions~ . A... 'Vell, he didn't care to talk to
Ine, that ""as all, that I can re1nen1ber. Q. I '11 ask you
w-hether or not he associated with you in the house. A.
\Vell, no because he 'vouldn 't eat at the same table with
me. Q. And did you see him or talk to him in the house
between 1neals. A. Yes, sir, in the evenings, somethnes.
Not very often. Q......tilld state what his attitude wa~
towards you on those occasions. A. Well, he wouldn't
talk, that was all. He didn't want me around. (Tr. 88,
89)

And proof of the fact that defendant Brimm continued to manifest the same attitude towards plaintiff
is also shown by her testimony: Q. Calling your attention to the time after you went to Ogden in the fall of
1949, state whether or not Mr. Brimm came down there
during the fall. A. Yes, he did. Q. Did he call there
and live with you in the apartment. A. No, sir. Q. What
happened then~ Just tell the Court what happened. A.
He lived in the Ben Lomond and I lived in the apartment with Mrs. Brimm. (Tr. 89)
And moreover, when the defendant Byron Brimm
absented himself from the plaintiff during the fall and
winter of 1949-1950, she not only lost the benefit of his
companionship, considerate and respectful treatment,
but plaintiff also thereby lost a large portion of the care,
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respectful treatment and companionship of defendant
flilda Brimm, who during the fall and winter of 1949 divided her time between her husband and the plaintiff.
Plaintiff testified that after Hilda Brimm returned to the
aparhnent from the weekend visits with her husband,
that she exhibited very little if any interest, consideration, or affection for plaintiff, and she was cross and
i r ritable with her.
There is also testimony to the effect that after
Hilda Brim1n returned from Minnesota about January
1~ 1950, that she neglected the plaintiff as disclosed by
plaintiff's testimony: Q. Now will you state to the
Court, as near as you can recall, what Mrs. Brimm did
or failed to do for you after she came back fron1 Minnesota in caring for you and so on. A. Well, it was
about the same as before. She didn't show as much interest in me when she came from ~iinnesota. Q. Did she
make any statements with respect to how it was affectjng she and her husband~ A. -Yes, it was causing a
separation between them, she said, -because I was living
in the apartment and Mr. _Brimm refused to come back
while I was there (Tr. 92, 93)
"'

And in addition to the foregoing neglect which
would affect plaintiff mentally, the evidence reveals
that defendant Hilda Brimm abused her physically.
This is _shown by plaintiff's testimony: Q. I'll ask you
to state whether or not Mrs. Brimm took hold of you
1n any manner during that time after she came back
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fro1n :Jlinnesota. ~\. Yes, she did. Q. "\Vill you describe
that to the Court: \Y.hat did she do, if anythingo? A. She
"~ouldn 't

.

let n1e go out because-and then she said I

"¥as also a n1enace to the aparhnent. Q. Did she tell
you 'Yh~~o? Did she explain or tell you why you were a
Inenace ~ ~-1... X o. Q. .._\nd no'v I '11 as~tyou whether or
not :Jirs. Brin1111 struck you or pushed you or anything·
like that. .._-\.. Yes, sir, she did. Q. Describe just how she
did that. ''7ha t did she do to you 1 A. \V ell, I was
going out one day and she didn't want n1e to, and I
had 1ny coat and was going to put it on, and she
didn't "~ant 1ne to go out, and she took hold of n1e
and pushed 1ne. Pushed you how~ Where did she
push you. ..._\. Oh, just around the room. She said I
w. asn't going out. Q. what part of your body did she
pusht _._\. Around my arn1s. Q. And what is the result of that~? What happened then as a result of that'?
Did you stay in the apartment then~ A. Yes, sir. (Tr.
94, 95)
z
The foregoing evidence clearly indicates the result
of the· attitude sho"rn by the defendant Byron Brimm
as early as July, 1949, when he first refusd to talk
to or associate with plaintiff, which contributed directly
to the defendant's breach of the contract, made between
the plaintiff and defendants on January 25. 1949. This
contract could not possibly continue with any degree of
success when defendant Brimm was continuously remaining away fro1n and not associating 'vith the plainSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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tiff.

During the period of time from July, 1949, to

February 13, 1950, a period of seven months, the plaintiff did not receive, from defendant Byron Brimm, any
cornpanionship,, care or personal attention.
one

This is

or the ilnportant elements under the contract. Ward

v \Vard 85 P 2d. 635; Payette v. Ferrier (Wash) 55 P.
G29; Thomas v. Thomas (Oregon) 33 Pac. 565; De Atley
v. Street (Montana) 263 Pac. 967; Anderson v. Reed
{New ~Iexico) 148 Pac. 502; Lewelling v. MeElroy
(Neb.) 27 N. W. 2d. 268; Caldwell v. Mullin (Colo.)
71 P. 2d. 415; Haataza v. Saarenpaa, (Minn.) 136 N. W.
871; Cree v. Sherfy (Ind.) 37 N. E. 787.
Under such circumstances it is not difficult to
conclude that plaintiff was neglected, and did not receive that kind, considerate and respectful treatment,
nor the care, love and affection that she was entitled to
under the terms of the contract which constituted the
consideration for the deed and bill of sale.
It is therefore submitted that the court erred in
making its Findings of Fact numbers 10, 12, and 14, (Tr.
51, 54, 56) wherein it found that the defendants did not
commit a breach of said contract, but on the contrary, if
a breach was committed, it was caused solely by reason
of the actions of the plaintiff, and that the defendants
''extended to plaintiff all possible attention, comfort,
kindness and companionship possible and help in every
way, but to no avail.''
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And the Court likewise erred in its Conclusions of

La,Y, ... ''That the defendants are entitled to a decree
finding and determining that the agreement entered
into between plaintiff and said defendants are valid,
effectual and binding one and that the said defendants
.,.,
J~
substantially performed the same; (Tr. 56) ,l(;fefendant Byron Brimm atten1pted to explain his failure to
associate with or render any care for plaintiff by saying
that she was dissatisfied with the John C. Anderson
deal, of June 23, 1949. This was denied by plaintiff,
and she testified that his attitude began to change against her in the latter part of July, 1949, at least a
n1onth after the .Anderson deal was consumated. Plaintiff made some inquiries about his apparent neglect
of the crops, and he told her it was none of her business.
It must also be remembered that the defendant
Byron Brimm began to turn against the plaintiff after
she had conveyed to his wife the record title to 8/9th of
the real property described in plaintiff's complaint; and
transferred by ·bill of sale the farm implements, household furniture and two milk cows; and also provided
Hilda with the sum of $2000.00, to purchase the 1/9th
interest in the real property, and had also authorized
that First National Bank to place Hilda Brimm's name
on the checking and savings accounts, giving her. autliority to withdraw money from both accounts. Then, and
not until then did he begin to change· his attitude towards plaintiff as shown by the foregoing testimony.
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'l'his property, real and personal 1s admittedly worth
$12,600, and apparently his attitude towards her was

engendered by reason of the fact that afteT the prop<>rty passed fro1n the proprietorship of the plaintiff to
l-tilda Brim1n, plaintiff then became, in the eyes of defendant Brim1n, a rnere vassal. She had placed herself
in bondage, and so far as he was concerned· she was
under his control as lord and 1naster. Although the
record title to the property was vested in Hilda Brimm,
the evidence fairly shows that defendant Brimm considered hhnself as proprietor of the property. And it is
also fairly deducible from the evidence that defendant
Byron Brinun strongly influences and dominates the
actions of defendant Hilda Brhnm. And they re-acted
accordingly, against the plaintiff.
The reaction of the defendants aginst the plaintiff
and particularly that of defendant Brimm, fits a pattern
quite prevalent in cases of this type. It seems to generate from the thought on the part of the grantee or his
or near relatives, that as soon as the deed is filed of
record, that the grantee then becornes the absolute owner
of the property. They entirely forget the important
.factor that the grantee holds the title as a trustee, during the li.fetin1e of the grantor, Glocke v. Glocke, (Wis.)
89 N. W. 118, 57 L. R. A. 458. They also forget that
the contract which .forms the consideration for the
deed, is a continuing contract, and is not entirely performed until the death of the grantor. Ward v. Ward,
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85 P. 2d. 635 and Payette

Y.

Ferrier ('Vash) 55 Pae.

629.
Fron1 the adjudicated cases, it appears th-at the coulpanionship, and cheerful consi~eration of the grantor
is, for the 1nost part, shown prior to the time the deed
is executed and filed of record, and that thereafter,
very frequently the '• defendants assun1e an entirely
different attitude towards the grantor.'' Ward v. Ward,
Supra, Sprangler, et al. v. Yarborough (Okla) 101 P.
1107, 1fcClelland v. ~1:cClelland (Ill.) 51 N. E. 559, Coywendall v. Kellogg (North Dakota) 198 N. W. 472 and
other cases too numerous to cite.
The case of Spangler, el.al. v. Yarborough, supra,
the pertinent facts are stated in the court opinion in the
following language :
''The petition states substantially that plaintiff is aged, infirm, with mind impaired, and in
poor health; that defendants are his sister and
her children; that on October 24, 1905, he was
the owner of a certain tract of land in said county, which was his homestead and which he described; that by means of false and fraudulent
promises and statements made to him by defendants which he relied on, believing the same to be
true, he was induced by them to enter into a contract to convey to defendant Myrtle M. Spangler,
his neice, his said homestead, which he did, in
consideration of which defendants, in substance,
therein agreed to provide him with a comfortable
home for life, together will all necessary food,
clothing, and medicines and the use of a horse
and buggy, and, in consideration of his personal
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property which he turned over to them, to pay his
debts; that as soon as said contract was signed and
said deed delivered, defendants assumed an entirely different attitude towards him, and wholly
failed to comply with their contract, and are trying to sell said land with a view to leaving the
country for parts unknown and leave him on
<·harity; that he had no adequate remedy at law,
and prayed that said deed and contract be caneeled.'' (Italics supplied).

In ~tftClelland v. l\IcClelland (Ill.) 51 N. E. 559, the
court, after reviewing the .evidence, said:
"It would appear, however, that his kindness
to her was for the most part prior to the time
-when the deed in question was filed for record,
to-wit, on December 24, 1892. Prior to this time,
to-wit on August 16, 1892, his father left the
premises, and remained away until January, 1893,
but returned in January, 1893, and remained until December 2, 1893, when both he and his wife
were obliged to leave the premises. The conviction forced upon the mind by reading the testimony is that the conduct of the plaintiff in error
towards his mother changed after she had directed the custodian of the deed to record it.'' (Italics
supplied)

And the above mentioned pattern was manifested in
the Ward case from the following language found in
the opinion on page 640, 85 P. 2d
"that the plaintiff has pleaded with defendant to change his course of conduct and to live
up to his agreement but the defendant has shown
a disposition to be inattentive, cold in his attitude
and somewhat disrespectful in his treatment of
plaintiff; that during the winter of 1935-6 the
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defe!tdant ,zcould go for 1ceeks tt'ithout speaking.''
(Italics supplied)
It i8 respectfully sub1nitted that \Vhat is said in tl1P
\\~ ard case can be directly applied to the instant case.
The parties in the case at bar got along agreeably until
after the last transaction was completed, on June 23,
1949. Defendants both lived with plaintiff from June,
1~)-±S. till about July, 1949, 'vith no disagreement or
trouble.
It is only natural too, that when Byron Brimm refused to be friendly to or associate with plaintiff that
it influenced Hilda Brimm, adversely, in her attitude
to,vards plaintiff. It is fairly deducible from the evidence that living under such circumstances would draw
both defendants away from plaintiff and she thereby
lost their companionship. She was thus left alone.
Yet, under the contract of January 25, 1949, she
was entitled to the support, respectful attention, and
cheerful companionship of both defendants. (Ward v.
Ward 85 P. 2d. 625.)
As proof of the fact that the defendant's neglect
of plaintiff was noticable to her in the summer and fall
of 1949, attention is drawn to the following testimony:
Q. I'll ask you this question, Mrs. Gibbons. Had you for
so1ne time previous to the day you left the apartment
and went to Mrs. Thornton's place, decided to rescind
this contract that was entered into1 A. Yes, sir. Q.
How long previous to that had you felt that way~ A.
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Oh, it started in the fall. Q. In the fall of 19491 _A_.
"\~ es,

sir, he fore I left for Ogden, I could see it wasn't

right.

Q. After that time were you n1ore or less dis-

Hatisfied 'vith the treatment you were getting there~
.A. I was. Q. Did you feel like you could have remained
there 'vithout affecting your health 1 A. No, sir. Q.
Hh.ve yon felt better since you moved out of there·~ A.
I have, ~~es sir. (Tr. 99, 100)
.t\nd as further evidence of the fact that plaintiff
d<~finitely decided that she would rescind the contract
before she left defendant's apartment on February 13,
1950, was the fact that she requested defendant Hilda
Br1nin1 to reconvey the property to her. That such request "~as 1nade by plaintiff is admitted by defendants
in their ans\\Ter, (Par. 8) wherein they allege that Hilda
refused upon demand to reconvey the property. (Tr. 11)
And as evidence of the fact that plaintiff could not
continue to re1nain with defendant Hilda Brimm and be
further Inistreated and neglected by defendants as she
had been over the period of time fro1n July, 1949, to
Februery 13, 1950, is evidenced by· plaintiff's testimony:
Q. Now I'll ask you whether or not you would live with
~Ir. and !frs. Brim1n in the future. A No ,sir. Q. Why
\vouldn't you do that~ A. Well, because I'd expect the
same treatmen that I have received. Q. From the treatInent you received when you moved out of the place~ A.
Yes, sir. Q. And you wouldn't want to put up with that
any longer; is that what you mean 1 A. Yes, sir, I couldn't
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stand it any longer. Q. You couldn't stand living with
them under the conditions you lived under before you
left~

A. No, sir, I couldn't. (Tr. 11-!)

The foregoing evidence sho,vs that the plaintiff exercised extre1ne patience 'vith defendants during the
aforesaid period of time, but their attitude towards her
did not improve but gre'v gradually worse.
Plaintiff testified it was affecting her health. She
'vas becoming very nervous, and 1\Irs. Thornton testified
that plaintiff was highly nervous and shaky when she
arrived at her home on February 13th. (Tr. 186) Mrs.
Thornton also testified that plaintiff had bruises on
her arms when plaintiff arrived at her home on Feb-·
ruary 13, 1950. (Tr. 186) It was very apparent from the
foregoing evidence that for plaintiff to have remained
in defendant's apartment longer under such an atnlosphere was not only intolerable but also i1npossible.
Thus, the situation prevailing there with respect to
how defendants' neglect and mistreatment of the plaintiff was affecting her health was identical to the manner
in which Mrs. vVard's health was affected in the Ward
case. This court said at page 635, 85 P. 2d. "that plaintiff has become ill in body and highly nervous.''
And as justification for plaintiff's decision to rescind the contract and request a reconveyance of the
property, (plaintiff- was not then aware that she had
made the bill of sale) is well stated in Johnson v. PaulSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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son, (l\iinn.) 114 N. W. 739;
''that said defendants have been unkind to
8aid plaintiff and that by reason of such treatlnent and disposition and feeling which they now
1naintain towards the plaintiff, and the plaintiff
towards them, It is improper and unfit that

plaintiff should live upon the premises with the
defendants, as it was contemplated by the aforesaid deed of conveyance that she should, and by
their conduct said defendants have rendered it
in~possible to carry out the provisions and conditions of the aforesaid conveyance; that said
plaintiff lived with said defendants upon the aforesaid pre1nises until on or about the 1st day of
January, 1906, when she left the same because of

the aforesaid faults and neglects of said defendants." (Italics supplied)
And moreover, the courts hold that in cases of this
nature, when there is evidence of a condition existing
between the grantor arid grantee, resulting from neglect
by the grantee, or the creation of a condition, that effects the well being of the grantor, and they cannot live
together, then the grantor 1nay rescind the contract,
and is entitled to be revested with the title of the property. From the evidence in this case it is apparent that
such a condition had arisen between the parties. Mrs.
Thornton testified that when Hilda Brim called her on
the phone to inquire if plaintiff could live there, Mrs.
Thornton asked Mrs. Brimm what was the matter and
the latter replied,-.''We can't get along together.''
(Tr. 186) Under similiar situation this Court in the
Ward case held that a breach of the contract had been
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conunitted by the son and his family in their neglect
of his mother. The findings of the trial court which
this Court held 'vas supported by the evidence appears
in the opinion as follo,vs :

''yet the court recognized the utter impossibility of plaintiff and defendant and his family
to continue to live in one home; that said difficulties have led to a family estrangement and,
as a result thereof, defendant and his family
do not treat the plaintiff with the consideration
that one might expect; that plaintiff has become
ill in body and highly nervous and that it is
impossible for the plaintiff and the defendant and
his family to live any longer in the same house.''
And another case in point arose in Colorado, Caldwell v. ~Iullin, 71 P. 2d. 415, where the plaintiff deeded
his property to his daughter in consideration of the
daughter's promise to support and care for him for life.
The daughter lived up to the agreement for about 2¥2
years, when she married. And as a result of the marriage, the daughter's attitude changed.
The trial court canceled the deed. The Supreme
Court affirmed the judgment, saying that,
''The daughter admits that everything was
serene until she married. xxThe father had spent
a lifetime accumulating the little fortune, and
was entitled to have it used for his comfort, peace
and security. The plan formulated by the father
and daughter failed of that purpose.''
The Washington case of Gardner v. Frederick et.
al. 165 Pac. 85, is very similar to the facts in the case
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at bar, and the trial court canceled the deed and· the
Supre1ne Court of that State affirmed the judgment
in favor of the plaintiff, a lady 72 years of age who
eonveyed property to her daughter and son-in-law in
consideration of their agreement to care for and support
her during the remainder of her life. After the plaintiff
had lived with the defendants about 4 month, she left
their home and lived with her other children. The defendants, on appeal, contended that there was ... ''no
~ubstantial evidence that the appellants failed to furnish
the respondent, during the time that she resided with
the111, the necessary physical co1nforts," but the Court

held:
''The aged parent is entitled to respectful
and considerate·· treatment, such as would naturally be· prompted by the filal affection of a child.
Without setting out in detail here the testimony
involving an apparently somewhat bitter conroversy between near relatives, it may be said
that the evidence was sufficient to justify the
jury in believing that the appellants did not show
to the respondent, during the time that she resided with them, that respectful and kindly consideration to which she was entitled. There is
some evidence that there was a deliberate attempt
to withhold from her that gentle sympathy which
not only would be prompted by filial affection,
but which the law, in cases of this character, demands. (Italics supplied)
In all of the reported cases examined by the writer,
none has been found- to be more extreme in establishing
a breach of the contract than the instant case. In no
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case has the facts sho\\"D that one of the parties renlained R\Yay fron1 the grantor for a continuous period
of about seven n1onth~, and until after plaintiff left
defendant ~s apartn1ent, ns 'vas ad1nittedly true in the
case at bar. It is difficult to in1agine ho"r any individuaL
'vould feel con1fortable living with one spouse, and
kno,:t.ring that her presence in the hon1e was keeping the
other spouse a'Yay. And then being told that her presence in the home would likely result in a separation of
the parties. Is there any vvonder that plaintiff was
driven to such desperation that on Sunday, February
12th, and in cold winter weather, she asked Mr. and
Mrs. Robbins to take her to her home in Mendon~
.._;\ case somewhat similar but not nearly so extreme,
is the case of Dodge v. Dodge, (1fich.) 52 N. W. 296~
w. hich is annotated in 112 A. L. R. 697, as follows:
"Where the complaint made was that one of
the grantees had treated the grantors with such
unkindness as to render it impossible for them
to continue to live in the grantee's- home, the
courts, although conceding that the grantors had
at times, been exasperating in their conduct, held
it quite clear that through the fault of the offending grantee, the purposes for which the conveyance was made had been defeated and that it
would be alike inequitable to .require the grantors
longer to attempt to live in the grantees' family
or to compel them to seek relief by abandoning
the home of their choice." (Italics supplied)
It will thus be seen from the decision of this court
in the Ward case, supported by the decisions in the
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~{ichigan,

Colorado, and Washington cases, which hold
that if any condition develops between the parties so
tTtat they cannot live harmonously together, and the
grantee does not render the services required by the
eontract, then there is a failure of consideration, and a
<'onsequent breach of the contract.
It is respectfully submitted that when the decision
in the \V ard case, supported by the other cases herein
referred to is applied to the evidence in this case, that
the findings, conclusions and decree made and entered by
the trial court to the effect that defendants had not
connni tted a breach of the contract is highly inequitable,
is against the great 'veight of the evidence and con8titutes a rniscarriage of justice.

And rnoreover, the defendants have failed to perform the contract under which the property was conveyed, and there is a failure of consideration, why_should
the defendant Hilda Brimm in equity and justice be
permitted to retain title to the property and operate the
farn1 ~ They violated the implicit trust once imposed in
, them by plaintiff. They had their opportunity and
" apparently didn't appreciate it. They wanted the property hut didn't want to render the necessary services
to acquire it under the terms of the contract. If they
had exhibited a conscientious, cooperative and friendly
attitude towards plaintiff, no trouble would have ensued.
.But after the conveyance, bill of sale, and assignments
'vere made, defendants exhibited an avaricious attitude.
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They thought more of property values than hu1nan
values.
In Finding of Fact No. 5, the Court stated that
all of the n1oney checked out and 'vithdrawn fro1n the
rhecking and savings account was used for plaintiff's
and no other purpose. Plaintiff testified that she signed
most of the checks in blank and an examination of the
checks will disclose this fact. From the appearance of
the checks and the fact that approxin1ately $2350.00,
\vas checked out for household purposes, between June
1, 1948, and September 10, 1949, presents a strong inference that these ch~.cks were also drawn for defendants use and benefit, at least defendants received a substantial benefit therefrom. (Tr. 10). However, it was
not the plaintiff's principal purpose in bringing the
third cause of action to show a miss-use of funds as
much as it was to show that plaintif's checking and
savings accounts were exhausted during the time that
these parties lived together and that the money, for the
most part, was used for family expenses. That is, for
the benefit of defendants as well as plaintiff. In prac-·
tically all of the reported cases the facts show that tho
grantee supports the grantor from his or her means,
vvhile the purpose of the third cause of action in this
case was to bring before the court the fact that plaintiff
had substantial savings and checking accounts, and both
of them were exhausted during the time the defendants
lived with her. The evidence shows that these accounts
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were closed out in the 1nonths of September, and Decenther, 1949.

In Finding of Fact No. 4, it is stated that John C.
Anderson, conveyed a one-ninth undivided interest in
the real property to defendant Hilda Brimm, for
$2000.00, which was paid by the with-drawal of this
an1ount fro1n plaintiff's savings account. When this
transaction occurred on June 23, 1949, plaintiff was sick
and unable to leave her home. ( Tr. 112) Plaintiff testified that Hilda received the $2000.00, to pay for this
interest in said property,- ''under the same condition
that she receivd the home". (Tr. 179) It would therefore follow that if defendants failed to live with and care
for plaintiff until her demise, there would be a failure
of eonsideration and plaintiff should be entitled to the
return of her 1noney.
In Finding of Fact No. 2, it is stated that plaintiff
hired defendant Byron Brimm to care for the crops
during the su1mner of 1948. The crops· had been planted
"'rhen the defendants arrived at Mendon in June, 1948.
Defendant Brimm had been unemployed for about eight
1nonths prior to this ti1ne. Plaintiff said that no particular arrangement had been made about caring for the
crops and this seems to be corroborated by the testimony
of Hilda Briinm; ''A. When "\Ve came up to Mendon to
spend the suminer with her, she said, 'Don't make any
plans of giving up your apartment or your job,' because it seems she had made arrangements with some
one else to get the crops, and she says, 'There is noSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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tl1ing here for you. You n1ight as 'vell keep your school
and apartment,' which 've did.'' ('rr. 257) It thus
appears that they lived together as a family during tho
sun1n1er of 1948, the incon1e fron1 the farn1 crops were
deposited to the plaintiff's checking account, and the
money was checked out for fan1ily use. (Tr. 21, 22) The
defendants had no car at that time and they used plaintiff's car for family purposes, and for their owu use.

(Tr. 357)
In connection with this matter it should also be
re1ne1nbered that defendants kept the entire inco1ne front
tlie crops gro-\vn upon the property in the year 1949,
and were living in the home and operating the plaintiff's
car for their personal use, (Tr. 357) and checks were
dra"\1\-ru against plaintiff's bank account for family use,
during the cropping season of 1949. (Tr. 22, 23) In other
words, while plaintiff's checking and savings accounts
''rere being diminished defendant Brimm was operating
the farm during the year 1949, and none of the receipts
were deposited to plaintiff's bank accounts. (see PI's
Exs. G to 0 inclusive, and Ex. T.) These bank statement
disclose that no amou!lt was deposited to either account
except the sum of $86.85, which was deposited to the
checking account on August 17, 1949, and it doesn't appear· from what source this sum was received. And the
judgment awarded the crops for 1950 to defendants.
Point 3
Finding of Fact No. 11, the Conclusions of I~aw, and
pe&I fi CHI h hat S@llP@@ t@is SllfH V18:8 Feeev;eEl.
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tT1e Decree, state and provide that the defendant Hilda
A. Brimm is the owner of the property in question, and
that she now stands, ready, willing and anxious to perfo nn her part of the agreement. It further states and
provides that her husband, defendant Byron , Brimm,
al~o is willing to cooperate therein. And they have consented and agreed that plaintiff may live alone in her
ho1ne at ~iendon, and defendants will pay for her keep,
inc] uding the reasonable cost of a lady to assist plaintiff
in the event of her illness.

It will thus be seen that the court, by the foregoing findings, conclusions and decree, has made a ,new
and different contract than the one made by the parties
herein, the terms of which are alleged in paragraph five
of plaintiff's amended complaint. That contract, by its
terms, provided that if plaintiff would convey and transfer her real and personal property to the defendant
Hilda Brimn1, that the defendants would live with the
plaintiff, care for and nurse her in her sick and enfeebled. condition, and treat her 'vith due respect and affection, and 1naintain and support her and be companions
to her for and during the remainder of her natural life.
And the ter1ns of the contract as so alleged is conceded by the court in its finding No. 10, (Tr. 52) wherein
the court finds,- ''that said conveyances were so made
to the said Hilda A. Brim~ in consideration, xxx that
plaintiff be permitted to live with the said Hilda A.
Brim1n and her husband, Byron, Brimm, as a member
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of their fan1ily, 'Yithout paying any amount therefor,
during the re1nainder of plaintiff's life."

It is respectfully subn1it~ed that the court had no
po"'"er to 1nake a new and different contract between
the parties as 'vas 1nade by its Findings of Fact No.
11 ,and its Conclusions and Decree "!herein the defend-

ants are relieved of perforn1ing~ the principal duties
required by the original contract.
In ±5 ..._.\ln. Jur. 58f, the rule is stated:
''A cou:~;t has no power to supply an agreement which was never made, or to alter or amend
a contract which the parties themselves have
understandingly made, for it is the province of
courts to enforce contracts, not make or alter
them." (Italics supplied.)
In Deseret National Bank v. Burton, 17 Utah 43,
53 P. 215, this Court held:
''A court of equity has no power to alter or
reform an agreement made between the parties
since this would be in truth the power to contract for them."
The courts emphasize the importance of the personal care, companionship, kindly and affectionate
treatment as well as support and maintenance by the
grantee to the grantor. The cases unaninously hold that
the consideration for a deed of this charcter becomes a
personal and continuing duty, and strict performance
rests upon the grantee and cannot be shifted or transSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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fered to another. In support of this doctrine, reference
is n1ade to the language used by the courts in the followlug cases:

rl,he Hupren1e Court of Washington in Payette v.
l~.,errier, 35 l'ac. 629, at page 630, said:
"It appears from the complaint in the preBent case that the sole consideration for the conveyance from the plaintiff to his daughter and
her husband was their agreement to support and
1naintain him. The duty to do so was arid became
a personal and continuing one. The obligation
was not assignable, but to be performed by them
only xxxx We think there is also another
reason why the plaintiff is entitled to be revested
U'ith title. The covenants of the grantees to support and maintain the plaintiff were personal,
and died with them. The happening of that event
put an end to the obligation. Upon principle, the
question does not differ from the one we have
just discussed. The right of the parent to a return
rests in either case upon the failure of consideration, and inability of his child to render the service or perform the condition upon which he was
intrusted with the property.'' (Italics supplied)
In an early Oregon case, Thomas v. Thomas, 33 Pac.
GG5, the court said:
''The contract of the defendant S. K. Thomas
to give his father a home and support upon the
the land, as a part of the consideration for the
conveyance, was a personal obligation, to be performed by him alone, and could not be assigned,
without consent of the father, so as to substitute
some other person in his place. The principal
consideration for the deed to the son was the
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support and n1aintenance of the plaintiff upon
the farn1 during his old age, by one of his own
flesh and blood, and not by a stranger. His object was to have his son reside and take care of
hin1 during the remainder of his life, on the
premises co~veyed. This was the motive which
prompted him to make the conveyance, and the
condition upon 'vhich it was accepted." (Italics
supplied)
The Supreme Court of Montana, in De Atley v.
Streit, 263 Pac. 967, held that the grantee's duty under
the contract could not be transferred to another person.
''It is very generally held that a contract
like that in question is a personal one and cannot
be transferred to a third person without the consent of the parent, and that an attempt so to do
gives the parent the right to revest the property
in himself. The reason for the ·ruling is obvious.
the parent contracts for -his support and maintenance ·by one of his own kin, one who will treat
him with the reverence, respect, affection and
devotion due to him from one of his own flesh and
blood, and not ~or such mere formal contributions
as a stranger would make. The above ruling is
anounced and many cases are cited in Thomas v.
Thomas, 24 Or. 251, 33 P. 565.'
In the case of Anderson v. Reed, (N. M.) 148 Pac.
502, the facts are very similar to those in the case at bar.
In discussing the nature of this sort of contract, the
court said:
"Such a consideration as the above is not regarded as an ordinary obligation, but is of a
peculiar character, imposing upon the grantee
burdens which must be performed, if he would
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retain the benefits of the contract.

Courts of
equity, because of the inadequacy of any legal
remedy, do not hesitate to set aside such contracts
upon proof of failure to perform by the grantee.
Such courts are not so much concerned as to the
proper theory upon which such contracts may be
avoided, as they are that they must be set aside
inorder to prevent grave injustice and the imposition upon aged people, by unscrupulous persons who pretend love, devotion, and friendship,
u,'here no one of such elements exists." (Italics
supplied)

In the Nebraska case of Lewelling v. McElroy, 27
N. W. 2d 268, the nature and purpose of the action is
stated in the opinion as follows:
' ' This is an action to cancel a deed to real
estate on the ground that the consideration therefor 'vas a promise to care for the grantor during
her life time. xxx The grantor pleaded that the
grantee and his wife promised that if grantor
'vould convey the property to them, they
would remain in the home and care for her
as long as she lived, and that relying on
the promise and without any other consideration
she made the conveyance. xxx Was there a failure
of the consideration~ What did the grantor contract to receive and the grantee to furnish~ The
grantor had a home, a rental property, and her
pension. These obviously were sufficient to furnish food and clothing and shelter. Just as obviously she contracted to receive that attention and
care that an old lady desired over and above
physical wants. The care was to continue during
the ,life time of the ,qrantor. That she did not receive." (Italics supplied)
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It 'vill thus be seen fro1n the decisions that the
grantee shall retain the title to the property only as long
a~ the grantee continues to render personal services for
the grantor. Ho,vever, by the decision of the trial court
in the instant case, the defendants are relieved front
living \Yith or rendering any further personal service
for the plaintiff, but nevertheless, are permitted to retain the title and possession of the property, and the
inco1ne therefron1. Defendants are now permitted to live
separate and apart fron1 plaintiff, and are merely required to pay for her- keep, 'vhich the court has fixed
at $75.00 per month, (Tr. 518) and permit plaintiff to
live in the home. The latter provision is no hinderance
to defendants as they live in Ogden, where defendant
Hilda Brimm is now teaching school. But the plaintiff is required to live alone and shift for herself.
It is respectfully submitted that the court has made a
ne\v contract between the parties, by which the consideration has been materially, if not entirely changed.
In arriving at its decision as to whether the:re was
or was not a breach of the contract committed by the
defendants in this case, the court adopted a very unique
n1ethod of procedure, as the record will disclose:
J1tly 31, 1950 ( T r. 499-501)

THE COURT: "Without passing judgment on the
merits at this time, the Court is going to allow the defendant five days to elect, if they so desire, whether
the Court may make findings and decree to the effect
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that this lady (plaintiff) n1ay reside in that house the
rest of her natural days and hire whatever housekeepers
:-;he wants, at reasonable expense to be fixed ·by this
t~onrt.

xxx hut otherwise the court enters an order in

favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants setting aside all deeds, bills of sales and every. conveyance
of every kind and nature and permitting the defendants
to have this year's crop, less the taxes, in full for all
~ervices, but also awarding them 1/9 of this ground
to take care of the deed she'd made.'
l\IR. HEINRICH: ''As far as we're concerned, Your

I-Ionor, the consent may be deemed to be put in the reeord right nO\V. vVithout waiting five days."
l\fR. NELSON: ''But what finding does Your Honor
1nake on the breach of the contract~''

THE COlTRT: ''With that statement in the record, the
court \Yill no\v 1nake a finding to the effect that you
haven't sho"'rn a substantial breach of the contract, so
as to entitle you to a rescission, and I make a find against you in view of that statement.''
MR. NELSON: ''In other words you're holding there
\Vas no breach of the contract.''
THE COURT: "No breach of the coptract. They having consented that the Chancellor may insert these
equitable provisions in the findings. If they hadn't consented I would have jumped the o~her way."
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eided that thE:Are "'"as a breach of the contract but thi~
"~as nullified and changed to a decision of '~no breach''
by the pron1pt consent of defendants' counsel to accept
of the court's proposition.
In the foregoing decision there is manifested a total
lack of concern for the welfare of an aged and infirm
person. The court seemed to be concernd only for the
unjust enrichment of the defendants. Conceding, as the
court did, that there was sufficient evidence to prove
a breach, yet, in order to promote the welfare of the
defendants the court permitted them to dictate the ter111H
of the judgment by merely filing the so-called consent.
The judgment also unjustly penalizes an aged and
infirm person, although the general rule requires the
eourts to zealously safeguard their interests to the end
that they may not be victimized by the unscrupulous.
1\fr. Justice Wolfe, in his concurring opinio_n in the Ward
case, 85 P. 2d. 635, refers to the trial court's memorandum opinion wherein it is stated ''that it would be
extremely inequitable to compel the plaintiff to carry
on the relationship as it has heretofore existed, merely
for the sak/e of affording to her son an option for the
purchasing of the property at her death.'' The foregoing
rule should have been invoked by the trial court in the
case at bar.

Point 4
On or about May 25, 1950, plaintiff commenced an
action to cancel and set aside the purported written
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assign1nent of the note and mortgage (Defendants exhibit 3), in the District Court of Power County, Idaho,
'vhere the land described in said mortgage is situated..
rrne SUll1lllOnS was duly and regularly issued by the
Idaho Court and was served upon the defendants in
(~ache County, Utah, on June 12, 1950, on vv-hich date
trial was commenced in the case at bar. When the trial
\\v~u~ resumed on June 21, 1950, (Tr. 157), the defendants
1noved the court for permission to file an amended an~\\' e r to interplead the transaction involved in the Idaho
action, in the instant case. This motion was resisted by
plaintiff, because the District Court of Power County,
Idaho, had acquired jurisdiction of the defendants by
~ervice of summons upon them, which they did not
question; ( Tr. 159) and the property described in the
n1ortgage refered to in the written assignment, (Defendant's exhibit 3) is located in Power County, Idaho,
( Tr. 158). Nevertheless, the trial court permitted the
defendants to file said amended answer (Tr. 161) and
later admitted evidence relating to said transaction over
plaintiff's objection. (Tr. 254)
Plain tiff also moved to strike the pleading denominated consent, (Tr. 40, 41) and also the Findings of Fact
numbers 6, 7, 11, and 13, and its Conclusions of Law and
Decree, and as much thereof as pertained to the assignInent of the note and mortgage in question. (Tr. 4?, 43,
44)
Plaintiff's action in the State of Idaho, is brought
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to cancel and set aside the purported assignment of said
note and mortgage and to remove the cloud from the
title to said property, cast thereon by the filing of said
purported assignment, in the office of the County Recorder of Power County, Idaho.
While defendants' aforesaid motion to interplead
was under discussion the court announced upon two
occasions that if plaintiff's action in Idaho was brought
to remove a cloud from the title, the court didn't' •propose to make findings of fact in a suit to quiet title
in Idaho," (Tr. 161) and the court further stated, "As
I said before, if you've got a suit to ren1ove a cloud up
there, this case will not interfere with that proceeding.''
(Tr. 163, 164)
When the trial court conceded that it would not interfere with the Idaho suit, if it was an action to remove a cloud, which it is, plainti~f's counsel was led to
believe that the court would finally eliminate any issue
involved in that case from the judgment in the instant
case.
The court also entirely ignored the fact that the
Idaho court had acquired jurdisdiction of the defendants. And before the court had entered its judgment in
the instant case, it was informed that the defendants
had made a general appearance in the Idaho case. (Tr.
509)
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volved in the Idaho action. And the Court expressed
doubt- ''whether the pleadings will support findings
on the Idaho property.'' (Tr. 506)
[t

is respectfully submitted that this action was

vroperly instituted in the State of Idaho, where the
property effected is situated under the following rule
~tated

in 12 C. J. 478
''The rule supported by the weight of authority in the United States, however, appears to be
that executory contracts relating to real property are governed as to their requisites, validity,
and effect by the law of the place where the
realty is located."

The same rule is applied by the Supreme Court of
Idaho, in Knudsen v. Lythman, 200 Pac. 130:
"Appellant has also sought to avoid the
consequences of the rule by the fact that this
1nortgage was executed in the state of Washington. This contention is wholly without merit, for it
is settled law that every instrument affecting the
title to real property is subject exclusively to the
laws of the state or government within whose
jurisdiction the real property is situated. Hannah v. Vensel, 19 Idaho, 796, 16 Pac. 115.
The appellant respectfully submits to this Honorable Court that the findings, conclusions and judgment
of the trial court be reversed, remanding the case and
directing that the trial court enter findings, conclusions
and decree, canceling the deed and bill of sale; and to
enter such judgment with respect to the other causes
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of action as equity and justice het"~P~n the parties will
dictate, and to eliminate the i~snPs involved in the Idaho
case.
Respectfully subnz it ted,

L. E. NELSON
. ..\ttorney for Plaintiff
and Appellant

'
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